In our previous article, we exposed Yuriy Gudilin, a Russian FSB agent and ‘electrician’ who has been secretly shaping Moldova’s political landscape. Now, we delve deeper into Gudilin’s connections to key Moldovan politicians, revealing a complex web of influence that threatens the country’s democratic processes. As Moldova approaches its September elections, we examine the extent of Russia’s interference and the individuals involved.
Figure 1: Gudilin’s expanding circuits
Plugged In: Gudilin’s Moldovan Network
Gudilin frequently appears with politicians from across Moldova, both those openly supportive of the Kremlin and those hiding their true allegiance behind a banner of independence. Gudilin is known to maintain ties with various Moldovan political figures including Party of Socialists MPs Bogdat Tireda and Adrian Albu as well as former President Dodon.
A key connection we have uncovered is Gudilin’s relationship with Ion Ceban, the Mayor of Chisinau and a member of Alternativa. FSB Officer Gudilin brokered an agreement for Roscongress subsidiary RK-Invest to work on projects in Chisinau, a fact that has received little attention. RK-Invest is a subsidiary of Roscongress, widely seen as a Russian soft power tool used to exert influence and channel funding in regions of interest to Russian intelligence Services. According to reporting from 2022, Roscongress Foundation Deputy Director Colonel Grigory Velikikh, a former FSB officer and member of the Operational Information Department, was responsible for supervising Ceban. Gudilin played a crucial role in facilitating this access.
Gudilin is also linked to Elena Panus, a close associate of Ceban. Gudilin advised Panus on Russian investment in real estate in Chisinau. Panus openly expresses her pro-Russian and eurosceptic views as Vice President of ‘Our Party.’ The party’s founder and leader, Renato Usatii, is also a eurosceptic who has claimed that the EU is disintegrating and “wants to drown the country in debts so that it has to volunteer to reunite with its better-off neighbor Romania.”
Ceban’s frequent travels to Russia and his pro-Moscow stance have raised eyebrows, particularly given Alternativa’s purported pro-European stance. Ceban’s ongoing contact with Gudilin, an FSB agent with connections to various Moldovan politicians, raises concerns about Alternativa’s true loyalties and whether it is being used as a Kremlin Trojan Horse to attract pro-European voters.
Photo: Gudilin (top), Tsirdea & Dodon (bottom)
Alternativa: The Kremlin’s Trojan Horse
Other prominent Alternativa members also have connections to Moscow. Mark Tkaciuk, a co-founder of Alternativa and leader of the ‘Civic Congress’ party, has faced criticism for advocating greater autonomy for the Gagauz region, a Moldovan territory with a pro-Russian majority. Tkaciuk has also maintained friendly ties with Moscow, including a personal relationship with Vasily Kashirin, an individual tied to the Kremlin.
Kashirin is a Deputy Director at the Russian Institute for Strategic Services, a Kremlin-linked agency that was formerly part of the SVR. According to the Warsaw Institute, the agency continues to operate as an intelligence entity involved in hybrid operations. Kashirin has been involved with Moldova throughout the last decade, making provocative claims about Russian citizens in Transnistria facing a transport, logistics, and economic blockade, as well as alleging cooperation between Kiev and Chisinau. In 2014, Kashirin was detained at Chisinau airport by border police and denied entry to Moldova for his subversive activities.
The ties between Russian operatives and Moldovan politicians extend beyond Alternativa. In June 2025, several pro-Russian Moldovan politicians, many with ties to Gudilin, attended the St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF).
SPIEF attendees included:
• Igor Dodon (formerly associated with the Socialist Party)
• Marina Tauber (Victory party)
• Regina Apostolova (Victory party)
• Irina Vlah (Heart of Moldova party)
• Vasile Tarlev (Future of Moldova party)
• Diana Caraman (Communist party)
• Alexei Lungu (Chance party)
• Tatiana Cociu (Mayor of the city of Orhei).
Ilan Shor, a sanctioned oligarch and political meddler, was also among the attendees. Shor, convicted of fraud and money laundering, is subject to US sanctions for undermining Moldova’s democratic processes. His Shor party was banned in 2022. Despite this, Shor backed the Victory Bloc ahead of the upcoming elections, which has recently landed itself with election bans. His continued involvement has raised concerns among some pro-Russia politicians, who question his value to their cause given his dwindling influence over the Moldovan electorate.
Who funded SPIEF? Roscongress of course. The SPIEF provided a platform for pro-Russian Moldovan politicians to connect with their Russian counterparts and potentially meet with FSB handlers, such as Gudilin. This highlights the FSB’s pervasive presence in Moldovan politics and their involvement in business deals.
A Web of Deceit: Russia’s Influence in Moldova
Yuriy Gudilin’s activities and ties to Moldovan politicians expose a sophisticated Russian influence operation aimed at shaping the country’s politics. Gudilin is an example of how FSB operatives facilitate business deals in Moldova with politicians who claim to be independent of Kremlin influence, while maintaining links to the pro-Russian camp. There is a clear connection between pro-Russian figures like Dodon, Gudilin, and Ceban, with Ilan Shor’s influence looming large over them all.
As Moldova approaches its September elections, the implications of Russia’s ongoing interference are clear. The potential coalition between pro-Russian parties, facilitated by figures like Gudilin and Shor, poses a significant threat to Moldova’s democratic processes. In our final article in this series, we will return to SPIEF and examine the potential consequences of a pro-Russian government in Moldova and the role of key players like Ilan Shor and Yuriy Gudilin in shaping the country’s future.
