When a news story vanishes after a few clicks, it’s easy to blame a glitch or assume it was taken down. What’s less visible is the infrastructure that determines whether a website stays online at all.

For Russia’s state-aligned think tank Rybar and the FSB-linked outlet NewsFront, along with a broader ecosystem of propaganda sites, that decision often rests with a little-known company: StormWall. Marketed as a legitimate cybersecurity provider, the firm operates as a Russian-run service with a carefully constructed international facade.

This is a closer look at how it works—and why it matters.

A Russian “Cloudflare” in Disguise

StormWall offers services similar to industry giants like Cloudflare: protection against distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and a global content delivery network designed to keep websites fast and accessible. But unlike its Western counterparts, StormWall is owned by Russian entrepreneurs Alexey Shiyan and Ramil Khantimirov and is headquartered in Moscow’s Skolkovo Innovation Center, a hub already under Western sanctions.
In 2017, the company began building a parallel identity abroad. It registered a Slovak entity, StormWall s.r.o., alongside a company in the United Arab Emirates. These entities share the same branding, infrastructure, and technical backbone as the Russian operation but omit any reference to Russia.
The Slovak website replaces Russian contact details with UK and US numbers and lists global brands such as KFC and Volkswagen as clients, part of a deliberate effort to project legitimacy.

In practice, the separation is largely cosmetic. Traffic routed through StormWall, whether accessed from Moscow or London, moves across the same underlying network. A report by Vsquare, “Doxing: When Private Data Becomes a Russian Weapon,” notes that related entities, including Storm Systems LLC, have provided hosting for the FSB-linked outlet NewsFront.

A Web of Shell Companies

StormWalls resilience appears to rely on more than infrastructure. It is also supported by a network of shell companies that exist largely on paper. The company’s services are tied to a vast pool of IP addresses, critical digital assets that allow websites to function. These addresses are formally controlled by dozens of small firms, many registered in the United Kingdom.

Corporate records reveal recurring patterns.

Virtual offices: Many companies share the same London address, 71–75 Shelton Street, commonly used for low-cost mail forwarding. Young, foreign-linked directors: Directors are often in their 20s or early 30s, frequently Russian nationals or residents of Eastern Europe. Minimal financial activity: Filings show little to no revenue, despite control over significant digital infrastructure. Compliance gaps: Several companies have missed reporting deadlines, suggesting they operate primarily as legal fronts. Among them are U1Host Ltd, registered in November 2024, and CHSL One Ltd, incorporated in January 2026. Both are linked to the infrastructure supporting Rybar.ru.

The structure offers flexibility. If one company is flagged or shut down, another can take its place,while the underlying network remains intact.

Why It Matters

The implications extend beyond a single company.
Disinformation persists: As platforms like Telegram or VK face restrictions, websites become critical distribution channels. StormWalls infrastructure makes those sites difficult to disrupt.
Cybercrime finds cover: The same network has been linked to hosting for ransomware groups and other malicious actors. UK-registered shell companies provide a veneer of legitimacy for cross-border operations.
Sanctions are bypassed: By operating through entities in the UK, Slovakia, the UAE, and offshore jurisdictions, the network can evade controls designed to block Russian-linked businesses.
Reputational risks grow: Western brands listed on StormWalls international-facing site may be unaware of the company’s ownership structure. Their inclusion nonetheless lends credibility to the operation.

What Can Be Done

Experts point to several measures that could disrupt networks like StormWalls:

Earlier scrutiny: Companies showing red-flag patterns—virtual offices, low revenue, foreign-linked directors, and control of IP assets—could face enhanced review.
Registration delays: A short verification period for high-risk company profiles could limit rapid turnover of shell entities.
Upstream pressure: Internet providers that route traffic for these networks could be required to audit clients and cut ties with sanctioned entities.
Greater transparency: Expanding disclosure requirements for CDN and DDoS providers could expose the true ownership of digital infrastructure.
Coordinated takedowns: Targeting not just domains but underlying IP addresses and routing networks could prove more effective.

The Bottom Line

StormWall operates at the intersection of technology and geopolitics, a service provider that enables content to stay online, regardless of its origin or purpose. By combining technical infrastructure with a diffuse network of shell companies, it complicates enforcement efforts and obscures accountability.
For users, the mechanics are invisible. But when questionable sites remain online despite sanctions or repeated takedown attempts, the explanation may lie in the hidden systems that keep them alive. Dismantling those systems will require coordinated action from regulators, service providers, and civil society alike.

It has been less than six months since the pivotal parliamentary election in which the Moldovan people defied Russian interference attempts and re-elected President Maia Sandu’s pro-European government, but in just a few weeks’ time, another crucial vote is due to take place-this time in Hungary-that will have similarly far-reaching consequences.

On April 12th 2026, Budapest will hold its own parliamentary election, which will determine whether current prime minister Viktor Orban and his nationalist-conservative party Fidesz will continue their sixteen-year tenure or be ousted by their main rivals, the center-right opposition party Tisza and its leader Peter Magyar. For the first time in a long time, there is a chance that there could be a change of government in the central European country, which would affect not only its domestic politics, but have implications for key foreign policy issues, such as its position within the EU, its close relationship with Russia, and the war in Ukraine.

Viktor Orban

Ironically, the right-wing populist leader started his political career as a defender of Hungarian democracy. In the late 1980s, when the USSR was starting to crumble but Hungary was still a Soviet satellite state, he set up a liberal political movement called Fidesz, or Alliance of Young Democrats, and gave an impassioned speech to an estimated quarter of a million people on Budapest’s Heroes’ Square, calling for free elections and Soviet troops to leave the country.

Orban’s politics had shifted slightly to the right by 1998, when he became prime minister for the first time, but they were still broadly aligned with liberal democratic principles, and Hungary became a member of NATO and the EU during his tenure.

He was defeated in the 2002 elections, and over the years spent in opposition, his nationalism grew and he and his party moved further towards the political right. Fidesz swept back into power in the 2010 parliamentary election, winning with the two-thirds parliamentary majority needed to rewrite the country’s constitution and election laws. These and subsequent legislative changes have enabled Orban to win four consecutive elections in the years that have passed since then, and turn Hungary in to what he calls an ‘illiberal democracy’. His government has reduced judicial and media independence, undermined human rights, and nurtured a culture of corruption and nepotism that has enriched regime insiders and seen them occupy important institutional roles.

Orban has clashed with his fellow EU leaders over some of his right-wing and nationalist policies, particularly regarding migration, and his government’s failure to adhere to the EU’s laws and values has led to Hungary missing out on billions of euros’ worth of EU funding. However, the biggest point of contention between Brussels and Budapest has undoubtedly been Orban’s cultivation of warm relations with Vladimir Putin, and his refusal to align himself with the EU’s stance on the war in Ukraine. Hungary has repeatedly criticized sanctions against Moscow and the provision of military and financial aid for Ukraine, and has continued to buy large amounts of oil and gas from Russia. It has frequently exercised its veto power to obstruct efforts aimed at supporting Kyiv, as was the case last month when Orban blocked a 90 billion euro loan and a sanctions package amid a dispute with Ukraine over the Druzhba oil pipeline.

Ukraine has also become a central part of Orban’s election campaign. He is sticking with his tried and tested strategy of mobilizing the electorate by generating fear in society, and this time, he is portraying Ukraine as the primary threat to Hungary. He is framing the elections as a choice between war and peace, warning that Brussels and Kyiv are conspiring to drag the country into war, and Magyar is their puppet.

Orban’s Euroscepticism and his anti-Ukrainian position benefits the Kremlin, and he has long been accused of representing Russia’s interests in the EU. If Fidesz were to remain in power-the desired outcome for the Kremlin-Hungary would maintain its trajectory towards Russia. Moscow would continue to have access to the government of an EU member state through which to exert its influence, and Hungary would carry on sabotaging its Western allies’ efforts to support Kyiv and present a united European front. In the worst case scenario, this situation could prove to be the thin end of the wedge when it comes to fracturing the EU, which would make Europe easy prey for Moscow’s expansionist aims.

Peter Magyar

Meanwhile, it seems that Orban’s primary challenger has struck a chord with the large number of Hungarians who are tired of the prime minister’s authoritarian regime and frustrated by the state of the country’s economy, a cost-of-living crisis and widespread mismanagement. Magyar, who was once a top member of Fidesz, before launching his own party Tisza in 2024, has denounced the prime minister’s cronyism, close ties to Russia and antagonism of the EU, and has pledged to restore civil liberties, elevate living standards and ‘end Hungary’s isolation from the West’. With regards to the war in Ukraine, he has ruled out sending troops or weapons to support Kyiv, but has recognized Russia as the aggressor and advocated for a more distant relationship with the Kremlin.

According to most independent opinion polls, Magyar and his party are currently leading the election race. Analysts predict that a victory for Tisza would see Hungary shift back towards liberal democracy and EU integration and a cooling in relations with Moscow. This would lead to an improvement in EU cohesion and the weakening of Russia’s strategic position in Europe.

Russian interference

Faced with the prospect of losing his closest ally in the EU, it seems that Putin has stepped in to help. Earlier this month, he boosted Orban’s election campaign by announcing the release of two ethnic Hungarian prisoners of war from Russian captivity. Around 150,000 ethnic Hungarians live in Ukraine, most ‌of ⁠them in the Transcarpathia region, and the community’s language rights have long been a source of disagreement between Orban’s government and Kyiv. Putin made it clear that the prisoners were released at Orban’s request-a move designed to convince voters that only Orban is capable of maintaining good lines of communication with Putin and ensuring the security of Hungarians everywhere.

There have also been reports that Putin is supporting Orban’s re-election bid in more surreptitious ways. According to the Financial Times, Moscow has approved a covert social media campaign involving the Kremlin-linked Social Design Agency. In a planning document obtained by the news organization, the agency proposed spreading pro-Orban and anti-Magyar content online that would seem like it had been created by local users and could then be shared by Hungarian influencers.

Prior to this, investigative journalism network VSquare reported that Moscow has tasked a three-person team with keeping Orban in power. Citing sources at multiple European intelligence agencies, VSquare said that the political technologists will work out of the Russian embassy in Budapest on behalf of the GRU, but it is not known whether they are active yet. Overseeing the project is Putin’s First Deputy Chief of Staff Sergei Kiriyenko, who was also responsible for Russia’s interference campaign in Moldova. VSquare believes that Moscow plans to use similar methods to influence the elections in Hungary. Both the Kremlin and the Hungarian government have denied the allegations.

With less than four weeks remaining until voters go to the polls, we will be watching closely for any more signs of Russian interference. Moscow’s vested interested in the outcome of the election, plus the fact that support for Fidesz has far from collapsed, means that it is still possible that Orban could secure another term in office. What is certain is that there is a lot at stake and it is set be one of the most closely watched election races of the year.

‘I appeal to all citizens: we must not allow our country to be handed over to foreign interests’. This was President Maia Sandu’s rallying cry in the run-up to what she called the most consequential election in Moldova’s history. Indeed, when voters went to the polls in the parliamentary election on 28th September, they were not just determining the composition of Moldova’s parliament, they were making a choice between continuing on the path to European Union (EU) membership that Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) had set them on, or being pulled back into the Kremlin’s sphere of influence-an outcome which, given Moldova’s strategic location, would have repercussions far beyond its borders. The stakes could not have been higher.
With some opinion polls showing a drop in support for PAS due to the economic impact of the war in Ukraine and promised reforms not being delivered, and Moscow spending an estimated 200-300 million euros on its interference efforts, many commentators thought that a Russian success could be possible. However, In the event, the small democracy stood strong against what has been described as an ‘unprecedented’ Kremlin influence campaign. According to figures from Moldova’s Central Electoral Commission, President Sandu’s PAS won 50.2% of the vote and received more than twice the votes of the main pro-Russian opposition party, Patriotic Bloc. The Alternative Bloc came third with 8% of the vote. Retaining an outright majority means that PAS is free to continue accession talks with the EU and implement its program of structural reforms-a major setback for the Kremlin, which was aiming to derail the process by depriving the government of a majority through its support for both overtly and covertly pro-Russian electoral blocs. It also tried to weaken public trust in the state and divide Moldovan society using methods such as vote-buying, covert funding, cyber attacks and disinformation. Now that the dust has settled, we will look at what went wrong for Moscow, or more to the point, what Moldova did right.

Vigilance and Proactiveness

Prior experience of Russian interference tactics gained during the parliamentary elections in 2021 and the presidential elections and EU referendum in 2024 meant that Moldovan authorities were aware of the threats they might face, and were able to form a robust defense strategy which centered around being vigilant and proactive. This was exemplified by how they pre-empted election fraud by increasing the maximum sentence for vote-buying linked to organized crime to seven years in prison, fining those who sold their vote, and exposing the vote-buying network. These actions, combined with clear public messaging about the illegality of selling votes, appear to have rendered the network largely ineffective.

Strategic Communications

Regular communication with the public played a big role in Moldova’s overall response to the interference, but it was especially important in combating Moscow’s disinformation narratives. In the past, the government would not comment on them directly, but in recent years, it has prioritized debunking and even ‘pre-bunking’ disinformation, i.e. predicting what narratives the Kremlin might push and then giving the public the facts before the false information could gain any traction. The newly created Center for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation worked closely with social media influencers and the traditional independent media to amplify the truth behind the disinformation and help voters make better-informed choices. In addition to this, Moldovan authorities launched an information campaign of their own aimed at explaining the benefits of EU membership and the ways in which the country has already benefited from EU funding.

EU Support

During its time in power, PAS has worked hard to build good relationships with partners in European countries. Since 2021, the EU has allocated over 1.2 billion euros in grants and loans to strengthen Moldova’s sovereignty. It also supported Chisinau during this election by deploying a Hybrid Rapid Response Team to help on the ground, giving the government access to the EU Cybersecurity Reserve to assist in dealing with cybersecurity incidents, and creating a regional hub of the European Digital Media Observatory to focus on Russian disinformation in Moldova and other countries. A visit in August from the leaders of France, Germany and Poland ensured that Moldovan citizens knew that Europe was backing their government’s quest for EU membership.

The Diaspora

As was the case when Maia Sandu won the presidential election in 2024, the Moldovan diaspora-the majority of whom live in Western Europe-was instrumental in PAS’s victory. Nearly 280,000 Moldovans living abroad cast their vote, and as many as 78.5% of them were in favor of PAS remaining in power, which means that over 27% of the party’s votes came from the diaspora. Some experts refer to the Moldovan diaspora as ‘a stabilizing factor’ against Russian interference.

Fighting Corruption

Russian money has long played a role in the country’s politics, but the Moldovan authorities took steps in the lead-up to the election to signal their commitment to fighting corruption and implementing judicial reform. In August, governor of the Gagauzia region Yevgenia Gutsul was sentenced to seven years in prison on illegal campaign financing charges for her role in the now-banned Shor Party’s use of funding from Russia. Prosecutors alleged that Gutsul funneled undeclared funds into Moldova between 2019 and 2022 to support the party that was established by fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor.
In September, former leader of the Democratic Party of Moldova Vladimir Plahotniuc was extradited to Chisinau. Plahotniuc, who represents Moldova’s old system of endemic corruption, is accused alongside Ilan Shor of orchestrating the disappearance of $1 billion from Moldovan banks in 2014. Reporting from The Insider suggests that between July 2024 and April 2025 Plahotniuc met with Russian authorities to discuss a return to politics, and he has ties to many current Moldovan politicians, such as Igor Dodon. Gutsul and Plahotniuc’s arrests were a significant blow to the pro-Russian campaign, and boosted Sandu’s credibility in the eyes of the electorate at a key time. In another setback for Moscow, Moldova’s Central Electoral Commission banned the pro-Russian Moldova Mare and Heart of Moldova parties from participating in the election less than 48 hours before the vote was due to take place, after security officials uncovered evidence that the groups were using illicit financing and bribing voters.

The Patriotic and Alternative Blocs: what went wrong?

In the build-up to the election, some opinion polls hinted at the prospect of a tight three-way race between PAS, the openly pro-Russian Patriotic Bloc and the Kremlin’s ‘Trojan horse’- the Alternative Bloc. However, the two blocs’ results turned out to be more modest than expected.
The last-minute exclusion of the Heart of Moldova party had serious consequences for Igor Dodon’s Patriotic Bloc, given that it was one of the four parties that made up the coalition. It meant that in the final days before the election, the bloc’s focus was on restructuring its campaign and updating its list of candidates instead of mobilizing voters, which likely contributed to its lack of support. Dodon was also criticized for forming an alliance with Vladimir Voronin and Vasile Tarlev – discredited figures from Chisinau’s old political system who may have deterred voters.
The Socialist Party leader initially vigorously contested the election’s outcome and encouraged others to protest, but once the result was validated, he agreed to participate constructively in the new parliament. The Patriotic Bloc itself fractured as soon as parliament opened, with the Socialist and Communist parties forming their own separate factions. This has led to speculation that the two parties wanted to distance themselves from the Kremlin’s interference project, and possibly from the Future of Moldova party’s Vasile Tarlev, who has direct links to Ilan Shor.
As for the Alternative Bloc, its aim was to divide the pro-EU electorate and siphon centrist voters away from PAS, but it did not succeed. It seems that the Moldovan public saw through the bloc’s leaders’ attempts to whitewash their Russian connections. It did not help the coalition’s pro-EU image when in July its figurehead Ion Ceban was banned by Romania from entering its territory, and the rest of the EU’s Schengen Area, for five years on national security grounds.
In addition to this, just days before the election, Moldovan authorities seized 200 ballots from a Chisinau printing house that were pre-marked for the Alternative Bloc and were thought to have been intended for use in a carousel scheme-a method of vote rigging which involves voters casting their ballot at more than one polling station. Ceban denied any wrong-doing and claimed the ballots were for training purposes, but the incident may have raised concerns amongst the electorate about potential election manipulation.
As he pledged to do before the election, Ceban has given up the parliamentary seat that he won and returned to his role as mayor, but another of the bloc’s leaders, Aleksandr Stoianoglo, has confirmed that the Alternative Bloc will support the new government.

Russia’s Problem

For Russia, this was its third consecutive interference failure in Moldova, unsuccessful attempts to influence previous elections in 2021 and 2024. Some of the reasons for this defeat are outlined above, and there are also reports that some of Moscow’s local partners who were entrusted with paying for influence operations or bribing voters actually kept the money for themselves, but arguably the most important factor is that while the Kremlin may be adept at pushing negative narratives-in this case spreading disinformation about President Sandu and how closer ties with the EU would lead to economic collapse and the country being dragged into war-it is not able to offer a positive alternative, i.e. an attractive vision of the future that would persuade the majority of voters that closer ties with Russia would benefit them. It simply cannot compete with the EU’s core values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. This is reflected in the lack of support for pro-Russian parties in their traditional strongholds in the Moldova’s northern regions.

Is the Kremlin’s Influence Waning?

The outcome of this election has sent a powerful message around the world that it is possible for a fragile democracy to withstand a hybrid offensive by a major power. It also reinforces the growing belief that the Kremlin no longer exerts the hold over its near abroad that it once did, but it is important to remember that Moldova remains vulnerable to interference, and any missteps by its leadership could result in political turbulence and the former Soviet republic retreating into Russia’s orbit again. After all, Moscow will not abandon its efforts to erode democracy and undermine institutional trust in Moldova, and will no doubt remain undeterred in its attempts to hijack the democratic process in other countries as well.

We recently exposed Yuriy Gudilin and his deep ties to Moldovan politicians and the St Petersburg International Economic Forum. We have said previously that Russia’s influence in Moldova runs far deeper than previously thought, this still stands. With the country’s elections happening on Sunday, this has never been more important to highlight.

Today, we’re introducing someone new to the Moldovan mix. Meet Vadim Viktorovich Ciubara, a Moscow-based businessman with close links to Igor Dodon and his associates. We have managed to identify some relationships that haven’t previously been mentioned, relationships that we find interesting.

Vadim Ciubara has contacts that include Chisinau Mayor and Alternativa Bloc leader Ion Ceban, FSB Officer Yuriy Gudilin, Roscongress Deputy Director General Grigory Velikikh as well as figures from overtly pro-Russian parties in Moldova such as Igor Dodon, Irina Vlah and Alexei Lungu.

In November 1980 , Vadim Ciubara was born in Balti, north of Moldova but resides in Moscow with Russian citizenship. In his nearly 45 years Ciubara has built up quite a network of influence within Moldova, or is he just the front man? Let’s untangle this matted web.

A man of many interests: Food, travel, and anabolic steroids?

Ciubara seems to be an avid traveler, a good attribute some would say. According to his own travel map he has traveled to 60 cities in 31 countries.

A country that isn’t highlighted on this map is Armenia, but we happen to know that Ciubara has recently traveled Armenia . This of course, could just be an innocent oversight, but we get the feeling that he is purposefully not including this travel on his map?

Ciubara’s connections to influential figures continue to raise eyebrows. His presence on Igor Dodon’s 2017 trip to Mount Athos, suggests a level of intimacy and access that is not typical afforded to outsiders.

We also know that he likes to leave reviews on Yandex although nothing since November 2024. He seemed to thoroughly enjoy the pancakes with cottage cheese in a café in Kislovodsk.

According to ZDG, Ciubara has been on a mission to purge his social media accounts, deleting photos and securing his accounts. This might explain why his visit to Armenia isn’t on his travel map or Yandex reviews. People only tend to do this when they have something to hide… We can’t help but be suspicious about his activities there and the extent of his influence.

There have been accusations that Ciubara and Alexandru Dodon amongst others were involved in the illicit trafficking of anabolic steroids out of Transnistria, allegedly totaling over 150 thousand euros. Igor Dodon batted these accusations away as malicious slander and things seem to have gone quiet, we couldn’t leave this nugget out of our piece though, could we?!

Our sources have informed us that Ciubara has an interest in weapons . Travel, diplomatic pouches, weapons and anabolic steroids, what could possibly go wrong?

A Business Man?

We know that in 2015, Dodon, Ceban, Alexandru Dodon and Ciubara attended an official visit to the Krasnodar territory speaking about the relationship between Russia and Moldova. In fact, Totul.md described Ciubara as “a major businessman, considered Dodon’s ‘shadow advisor’, responsible for party financing who accompanied President Dodon on his trips to Russia as “representative of the Socialist Party in Moscow”.

Traveling with Dodon on his trips to Russia will have no doubt introduced Ciubara to countless individuals, not all of whom we are interested in for this piece, but we know about contact between individuals, such as our old friends Ceban and Gudilin, that haven’t been specifically mentioned before online before and wanted to make sure that people were aware.

That isn’t Ciubara’s only role, questions are further raised when we examined the circumstances around Ciubara’s company Media Invest Service. In 2015 it gained control of the Moldovan media channels, Accent TV and First (Primul) in Moldova, when Media Invest purchased their parent company Telesistem TV. Telesistem was purchased from Volga Export, a Russian entity for a mere 170 euros, a fraction of its original purchase price which is believed to be 30,000 euros. This suspicious transaction is further complicated by Ciubara’s purchase of a non-residential space in 2018, where he operated The First in Moldova. At the time this space was purchased, it had an estimated market value of approximately half a million Euros, however it is unknown how much or quite frankly how he paid for this.

According to RISE Moldova, in 2016, when Dodon was elected President of the Republic of Moldova, Telesistem TV benefited from 2.5 million lei which can be traced back to Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM).

These connections become even more intriguing when we looked at the representative of Media Invest Service in Moldova. Vadim Filipov is Lilian Filipov’s brother and a member of the Central Election Commission designated by the Socialist Party. Vadim holds power of attorney for the company, which allows him to make decisions in Ciubara’s absence. Vadim Filipov’s father, Grigore, was also a prominent figure in the socialist party and president of the Dubasari district, a city in the breakaway Transnistrian region.

Media Invest Service also acquired Media Contact, a company that manages high-impact social media sites in Moldova, including Russian platforms such as mail.ru, OK.ru, VK.com, Moy Mir, Noi.md. Accent TV and The First in Moldova broadcast programs from Pervii Kanal (First channel), a Russian TV station’s main propaganda channels, with close ties to Vladimir Putin’s government. This raises concerns about the spread of Russian propaganda within Moldova and the controls that these individuals have around censorship.

In December 2019, Ciubara sold the majority stake (51%) of Media Invest Service to Igor Chaika, the son of former prosecutor-general, Yuri Chaika, and business partner of Igor Dodon’s brother, Alexandru Dodon. This has sparked allegations that Ciubara was merely a straw man for the Dodon family, particularly Igor. Igor Dodon also announced, on the eve of the sale, that the Moldovan TV channels would have new Russian owners, which has further fueled this speculation and raised questions about the true ownership and control of these media outlets.

In 2021, just before the parliamentary elections, Igor Chaika’s majority ownership increased to 99.9%, a couple of weeks later he sold those shares to Russian company, Obedinennye Resursy, with Ciubara ceding his shares to the new majority owner in August 2021. Igor Chaika was sanctioned by the US for working on detailed plans to undermine Maia Sandu, and to return the Republic of Moldova to the sphere of influence of the Russian Federation.

Recent news reports that Primul in Moldova was targeted by searches conducted by Moldovan Police in a case of tax evasion and money laundering, linking back to who else but Ilan Shor.

A Family Man?

In the Eastern Orthodox faith, nasi godparents are a married couple who serve as models of a good marriage and have a significant role in the ceremony, becoming part of the family. In this case, a very large family.

It seems that the business relationships we have spoken about above go much deeper, there are familial ties here too… Igor Dodon and his wife are the godparents of Lilian Filipov and his wife, but who are the godchildren of Lilian and Diana Filipov, we hear you asking? Only Vadim and Natalia Ciubara …

It seems that it pays to have friends in high places, Lilian Filipov was appointed Dodon’s State Security Guard, on the day Dodon became President and remains a state security officer today for Dodon. Also appointed on that day was Sergiu Juncu, brother of Ina Catana who is the godmother of Igor and Galina Dodon. To us, this suggests a coordinated effort and raises concerns about the potential for nepotism and the abuse of power.

Or, just a Straw Man?

A man with friends in high places, an interest in drugs and weapons, and clearly connected with both Moldova and Russia. He is a key player in a complex network of connections that tie the Moldovan media landscape to Russian interests and the Dodon family. The true extent of Ciubara’s influence, links and motivations behind his actions remain to be seen, but one thing is for certain: the tangled web of interests and friendships surrounding Ciubara and Dodon demands closer scrutiny.

Complex circuits of influence

In our previous articles on Moldova, we have explored the connections between Russia, particularly through individuals like FSB Officer Yuriy Gudilin, that are wired throughout the country as the Kremlin attempts to extend Russian influence. We saw how events such as SPIEF are opportunities for the FSB to cultivate links across Moldovan politics. Here we see how characters like Ciubara have connections across Moldova and Russia, and can power the circuits that Moscow is using to ingrain Russian entanglement.

As we have discovered it’s becoming increasingly clear that the influence of Russian interests within Moldova’s government and media landscape are closely intertwined. Leaving key questions for Moldovans in the upcoming elections, about how Russia will continue to influence their country.

Following on from our last article where we revealed Russian FSB agent Yuriy Gudilin’s business deals and influence in Moldova’s political landscape. Our continuing investigation exposes the deep connections between Gudilin, Moldovan politicians, and the St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF). As we explore these connections and their ties to the FSB, it becomes clear that Russia’s influence in Moldova runs far deeper than previously thought, with significant implications for the country’s upcoming elections.

In June of this year, the 28th SPIEF took place in Vladimir Putin’s hometown. Once known as ‘Russia’s Davos’, the conference was created to showcase the Russian economy to foreign investors and attract world leaders, symbolizing East-West cooperation. However, since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it has become much less international, mainly attended by the Kremlin elite and their allies. While Russia’s war with Ukraine has undoubtedly been the main deterrent to potential guests, the forum’s links to the Russian security services cannot have helped.

The SPIEF is organized by the Roscongress Foundation, a state-linked entity that promotes Russia’s global image and facilitates business projects and investment. Our investigation suggests that Roscongress is also entangled in the FSB’s meddling in Moldova.

Uncovering the Ties Between SPIEF and the FSB

According to a report by the Dossier Center, Grigory Velikikh, Deputy CEO of the Roscongress Foundation, is acquainted with FSB General Dmitry Milyutin. The Insider recently reported that Milyutin was dismissed from his post overseeing the FSB’s 5th Service work in Moldova, which likely included overseeing Yuriy Gudilin. The Insider reported that Milyutin “hardly communicated” with the new chief of the 5th Service, Alexei Komkov, who favored a more subtle approach to dealing with Moldova. In contrast, Milyutin was quoted as saying he was “ready to go to Moldova with a machine gun”.

Velikikh is said to have attended a party in honor of Milyutin, where he praised Milyutin as a ‘commander’ and expressed his pleasure in working with him. It is not clear whether he was alluding to Milyutin’s work overseeing FSB meddling in Moldova.

The 2025 SPIEF committee list also includes Sergei Korolev, First Deputy Director of the FSB. According to Important Stories, Komkov, the new chief of the FSB’s 5th Service, is a protégé of Korolev. This connection highlights the ongoing ties between Moldova and SPIEF, suggesting that despite changes in personnel, the links to FSB remain strong.

Shining a Light on Gudilin’s Network

In our previous article, we exposed the Roscongress Foundation’s involvement in a development plan for Chisinau, Moldova’s capital. The plan was signed by Ion Ceban, Mayor of Chisinau and leader of the Alternativa Bloc, with RK Invest, a subsidiary of Roscongress. The agreement was facilitated by Yuriy Gudilin, a sanctioned FSB officer. If you haven’t read the previous articles on “the Kremlin’s electrician”, you can find them here: Wiring Moldova for the Kremlin, and Power Lines: The Spreading Influence of the Kremlin’s Electrician.

Alternativa’s Ceban is known to have attended SPIEF on more than one occasion, and it seems other members of Moldova’s opposition parties have no qualms about doing so either.

Photographs from this year’s event show former Moldovan President Igor Dodon attending the event alongside fellow Socialist Party members Zinaida Greceanii, Grigore Novac, and Vladimir Odnostalco. Notably, Dodon worked with Yuriy Gudilin, a sanctioned FSB officer, during his 2020 re-election campaign.

The Surge of Russian Influence at SPIEF

Moldovan politicians from other parties were also present, such as;
• Irina Vlah (Heart of Moldova)
• Vasile Tarlev (Future of Moldova)
• Diana Caraman (Communist Party)

Additionally, members of parties associated with Ilan Shor, a fugitive Moldovan oligarch, and his now-banned Victory Bloc have also been linked to SPIEF. Among them were;
• Natalia Parasca (Revival)
• Alexei Lungu (Chance)
• Vasile Bolea (Revival)
• Tatiana Cociu (FASM)
• Marina Tauber (who fled Moldova in January of this year)
• Vadim Fortescu
• Denis Ulanov
• Reghina Apostolova,
• and the man himself, Ilan Shor, who appeared on a panel in his capacity as CEO of the A7 company.

The number of Moldovan politicians attending the forum is striking, with representatives from across the political spectrum in attendance. Notably, FSB’s Yuriy Gudilin has been linked to several high-profile attendees, including Alternativa Bloc member Ceban, Socialist Party leader Dodon, and Victory Bloc affiliate Vasile Bolea. RISE Moldova and the Dossier Center exposed Bolea alongside Vladimir Odnostalco as having associated with Gudilin and his Russian colleague Olga Grak during Dodon’s re-election campaign. This reveals the complex network of connections that the Kremlin is cultivating to expand its influence over Moldova’s politics.

Circuits of Influence

The Moldovan delegation used the SPIEF forum as an opportunity to shape Moldovan-Russian relations. During a bilateral business panel, members discussed increased cooperation in the agricultural and food industries. According to Pravda, a Russian news source, the participants reportedly expressed their opposition to the current Moldovan government’s policies and their desire to reorient the country’s foreign policy towards Moscow. Representatives from four Moldovan parties (Vlah, Dodon, Tarlev, and Caraman) also met with senior members of Russia’s Ministry of Energy to discuss cooperation in the energy field. Dodon reported that the “first round of negotiations” had been completed. This raises concerns about potential FSB involvement, similar to the deal between Alternativa’s Ceban and RK Invest, facilitated by Gudilin.

The talks fueled speculation that the four party leaders were planning to form a coalition at the upcoming parliamentary elections. This suspicion was later confirmed when Dodon announced the creation of the Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, the Heart and Future of Moldova. Bloc representatives declined to comment on whether the idea had originated in Russia. Despite their silence, their attendance at FSB linked SPIEF raises concerns about potential Kremlin influence over the proposed alliance.

Flip the Switch or Disconnect

As Moldovans prepare to cast their ballots in the upcoming parliamentary election, they are faced with a critical decision despite the numerous options on the ballot. The choice is stark: between parties that are closely aligned with Russia and those that promise a more independent future. Russia’s influence in Moldovan politics is a pressing concern, with individuals like Yuriy Gudilin, tied to the FSB, having been linked to Moldovan politicians. Gudilin’s and his role in brokering deals between Moldovan parties and Russian entities raise important questions about the extent of Russian influence.

As the election approaches, Moldovans must weigh their options carefully, considering whether to continue on a path that could lead to further Russian entanglement or to chart a different course that prioritizes their sovereignty and self-determination

In our previous article, we exposed Yuriy Gudilin, a Russian FSB agent and ‘electrician’ who has been secretly shaping Moldova’s political landscape. Now, we delve deeper into Gudilin’s connections to key Moldovan politicians, revealing a complex web of influence that threatens the country’s democratic processes. As Moldova approaches its September elections, we examine the extent of Russia’s interference and the individuals involved.

Figure 1: Gudilin’s expanding circuits

Plugged In: Gudilin’s Moldovan Network

Gudilin frequently appears with politicians from across Moldova, both those openly supportive of the Kremlin and those hiding their true allegiance behind a banner of independence. Gudilin is known to maintain ties with various Moldovan political figures including Party of Socialists MPs Bogdat Tireda and Adrian Albu as well as former President Dodon.
A key connection we have uncovered is Gudilin’s relationship with Ion Ceban, the Mayor of Chisinau and a member of Alternativa. FSB Officer Gudilin brokered an agreement for Roscongress subsidiary RK-Invest to work on projects in Chisinau, a fact that has received little attention. RK-Invest is a subsidiary of Roscongress, widely seen as a Russian soft power tool used to exert influence and channel funding in regions of interest to Russian intelligence Services. According to reporting from 2022, Roscongress Foundation Deputy Director Colonel Grigory Velikikh, a former FSB officer and member of the Operational Information Department, was responsible for supervising Ceban. Gudilin played a crucial role in facilitating this access.

Gudilin is also linked to Elena Panus, a close associate of Ceban. Gudilin advised Panus on Russian investment in real estate in Chisinau. Panus openly expresses her pro-Russian and eurosceptic views as Vice President of ‘Our Party.’ The party’s founder and leader, Renato Usatii, is also a eurosceptic who has claimed that the EU is disintegrating and “wants to drown the country in debts so that it has to volunteer to reunite with its better-off neighbor Romania.”

Ceban’s frequent travels to Russia and his pro-Moscow stance have raised eyebrows, particularly given Alternativa’s purported pro-European stance. Ceban’s ongoing contact with Gudilin, an FSB agent with connections to various Moldovan politicians, raises concerns about Alternativa’s true loyalties and whether it is being used as a Kremlin Trojan Horse to attract pro-European voters.

Photo: Gudilin (top), Tsirdea & Dodon (bottom)

Alternativa: The Kremlin’s Trojan Horse

Other prominent Alternativa members also have connections to Moscow. Mark Tkaciuk, a co-founder of Alternativa and leader of the ‘Civic Congress’ party, has faced criticism for advocating greater autonomy for the Gagauz region, a Moldovan territory with a pro-Russian majority. Tkaciuk has also maintained friendly ties with Moscow, including a personal relationship with Vasily Kashirin, an individual tied to the Kremlin.

Kashirin is a Deputy Director at the Russian Institute for Strategic Services, a Kremlin-linked agency that was formerly part of the SVR. According to the Warsaw Institute, the agency continues to operate as an intelligence entity involved in hybrid operations. Kashirin has been involved with Moldova throughout the last decade, making provocative claims about Russian citizens in Transnistria facing a transport, logistics, and economic blockade, as well as alleging cooperation between Kiev and Chisinau. In 2014, Kashirin was detained at Chisinau airport by border police and denied entry to Moldova for his subversive activities.

The ties between Russian operatives and Moldovan politicians extend beyond Alternativa. In June 2025, several pro-Russian Moldovan politicians, many with ties to Gudilin, attended the St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF).

SPIEF attendees included:
• Igor Dodon (formerly associated with the Socialist Party)
• Marina Tauber (Victory party)
• Regina Apostolova (Victory party)
• Irina Vlah (Heart of Moldova party)
• Vasile Tarlev (Future of Moldova party)
• Diana Caraman (Communist party)
• Alexei Lungu (Chance party)
• Tatiana Cociu (Mayor of the city of Orhei).

Ilan Shor, a sanctioned oligarch and political meddler, was also among the attendees. Shor, convicted of fraud and money laundering, is subject to US sanctions for undermining Moldova’s democratic processes. His Shor party was banned in 2022. Despite this, Shor backed the Victory Bloc ahead of the upcoming elections, which has recently landed itself with election bans. His continued involvement has raised concerns among some pro-Russia politicians, who question his value to their cause given his dwindling influence over the Moldovan electorate.

Who funded SPIEF? Roscongress of course. The SPIEF provided a platform for pro-Russian Moldovan politicians to connect with their Russian counterparts and potentially meet with FSB handlers, such as Gudilin. This highlights the FSB’s pervasive presence in Moldovan politics and their involvement in business deals.

A Web of Deceit: Russia’s Influence in Moldova

Yuriy Gudilin’s activities and ties to Moldovan politicians expose a sophisticated Russian influence operation aimed at shaping the country’s politics. Gudilin is an example of how FSB operatives facilitate business deals in Moldova with politicians who claim to be independent of Kremlin influence, while maintaining links to the pro-Russian camp. There is a clear connection between pro-Russian figures like Dodon, Gudilin, and Ceban, with Ilan Shor’s influence looming large over them all.

As Moldova approaches its September elections, the implications of Russia’s ongoing interference are clear. The potential coalition between pro-Russian parties, facilitated by figures like Gudilin and Shor, poses a significant threat to Moldova’s democratic processes. In our final article in this series, we will return to SPIEF and examine the potential consequences of a pro-Russian government in Moldova and the role of key players like Ilan Shor and Yuriy Gudilin in shaping the country’s future.

In our previous article, we examined the Kremlin’s efforts to undermine Moldova’s pro-European trajectory, highlighting the influence of Ilan Shor and his allies involvement during the October 2024 presidential elections and the concurrent referendum on EU integration. This article continues our investigation, focusing on Yuriy Gudilin, a Russian FSB officer and political technologist, and Ion Ceban, a Moldovan politician with ties to Shor, as we explore their roles in shaping the Alternativa Bloc, a political alliance that is rebranding itself as a pro-European force despite its Kremlin-backed roots.

Figure 1: Gudilin’s circuits, new reveals coming soon.

Moscow’s Man in Chisinau: The Story of Yuriy Gudilin

Yuriy Gudilin may not be a household name, but his influence in Moldovan politics is significant. Born in Lviv, Ukraine, Gudilin is a Moscow resident who worked as a power grid engineer for MRSK Center, a Russian power grid company, in 2018-2019.

Gudilin’s activities, however, reveal a more complex picture. He has frequently travelled between Moscow and Chisinau around election periods, and is an active FSB officer and political technologist.

In 2020, Gudilin’s involvement in Moldovan politics became public when he was identified as part of a team of Russian consultants advising Socialist Party leader and then-President Igor Dodon during the presidential elections. A joint project released at the time by investigative journalism organizations RISE Moldova and the Dossier Center includes photographs of Gudilin and his Russian colleagues meeting with multiple high-ranking Socialist Party (PSRM) members. These meetings took place at the party’s headquarters and at other locations in Chisinau, including the presidential administration’s office.

As Gudilin’s activities became more public, it became clear that his influence extended far beyond his role as a consultant, and that he was a key player in Russia’s efforts to shape Moldova’s political landscape.

Short Circuiting Democracy

In 2022, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on Gudilin and two other Russian nationals, Olga Grak and Leonid Gonin, for their attempts to influence the outcomes of the presidential elections in 2020 and the parliamentary elections in 2021.

According to a statement released by the Treasury, when Gudilin and Grak met with the Socialist Party politicians in 2020, they pressured them to follow their guidance, promising to encourage the Kremlin to favorably consider future requests for assistance from the Moldovan government. Gudilin also orchestrated the illicit transfer of funds from Russia to support Dodon’s campaign, using the cryptocurrency Tether. According to the Moldovan security service, he was recruiting new members for his espionage and influence networks, using cryptocurrency as payment. Gudilin is also known to have worked with the Kremlin’s infamous Internet Research Agency on a plan to spread propaganda online.

Gudilin’s involvement in Moldovan politics predates his 2020 media exposure. In 2019, Igor Dodon inadvertently revealed Gudilin’s presence at a PSRM headquarters celebration for Ion Ceban’s mayoral win, taking a video on his phone that showed Gudilin among the known Russian political consultants present at the gathering.

Gudilin remains active in Moldovan politics, reportedly continuing to work on behalf of the FSB in anticipation of the 2025 parliamentary election. In our next article we will look further into just how far the Kremlin electrician’s wirings have spread.

The Power Behind the Alternativa Bloc

Ion Ceban, the current Chisinau mayor and former Dodon spokesman, has previously been known for his left-wing, pro-Russia, and anti-EU views. In 2014, he participated in a Brussels protest against the EU Association Agreement and backed an illegally held referendum in Gagauzia, where the majority voted against closer EU ties. However, Ceban appears to have experienced a dramatic and unlikely shift in ideology, having since founded the center-left, pro-European National Alternative Movement (MAN) in December 2021.

Moldovans are right to be skeptical of Ceban’s rebranding. According to the US Treasury, Gudilin and his team, having failed to sway the 2020 and 2021 elections, recognized the declining support for overtly pro-Russia politicians. They adapted their strategy, offering to help Ceban establish the National Alternative Movement party as a more subtle means of advancing Moscow’s interests.

The Alternativa Bloc, a new political alliance, was announced in January 2025, comprising Ceban’s National Alternative Movement, the Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova (PDCM), the Common Action Party – Civil Congress (PAC-CC), and former presidential candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo. This alliance has been gaining popularity among Moldovan voters.

While the Alternativa Bloc presents itself as a moderate, pro-European coalition, others have started to correctly recognize it as ‘the Kremlin’s alternative’.

The Investigation Continues

We have uncovered a complex network of connections between the Alternativa Bloc, Yuriy Gudilin, and Ion Ceban, further revealing ongoing efforts to influence Moldova’s political trajectory. In our next article, we will examine Ceban’s ties to Moscow and investigate the Russian connections of other key Alternativa Bloc members, including their dealings with Gudilin.

After months of intense research and investigation, we at nightingale are ready to shed light on the Kremlin’s meddling in Moldova’s recent elections. Our team has been working behind the scenes to uncover the truth about Russian influence in the region, and we’re now ready to share our findings. We’ve discovered that Ilan Shor, a fugitive oligarch with a history of manipulating Moldovan politics, is backing parties that present themselves as pro-EU but are, in fact, serving Russian interests. One such party is the Alternativa Bloc, which has been misleading Western-leaning Moldovans. In this series, we’ll expose the tactics being used to undermine Moldova’s pro-European trajectory and reveal the truth about the Kremlin’s influence in the region.

Moldova: The Prize in a Global Game

Often labelled the least visited country in Europe, it can be easy to overlook the small nation of Moldova, nestled between Ukraine and Romania in the east of the continent.

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many have wondered whether Moldova would be next in Moscow’s bit to regain control of the former Soviet republics. There have been concerns that Russian forces might attempt to join up with the roughly 1500 Russian soldiers stationed in Moldova’s breakaway region of Transnistria, thus simultaneously creating a new front against Ukraine and derailing Moldova from its pro-Western path.

Fortunately, this situation has not yet arisen, but the Kremlin is instead trying to secure Moldova’s alignment with Russia by waging a battle for influence in the political sphere.

Election Close Calls

On October 20th 2024, elections were held in Moldova to decide whether the country’s pro-European Union (EU) and reformist president Maia Sandy would remain in power for a second term. A referendum on whether to amend the nation’s constitution and make EU accession a constitutional goal took place at the same time. These two events were very significant because their outcomes would effectively determine whether Moldova would continue on its course towards the EU or veer away towards Russia.

Despite expectations of a landslide vote in favor of integration into the EU, the referendum only narrowly passed; and while Sandu won the presidential vote, her victory was not convincing enough to avoid a runoff, and she only defeated Russia-friendly opponent Aleksandr Stoianoglo in the second round of the presidential elections on November 3rd 2024.

Kremlin’s meddling Exposed

The close results of both votes raised questions about the factors at play. While the government’s performance was a feature, the close results were largely due to a sophisticated interference campaign orchestrated by the Russian State. The Russian State used a network of operatives to buy votes, transferring large sums of money to Moldovan citizens’ bank accounts. Moldova’s chief of police revealed a network aimed at paying citizens to vote against EU integration, allegedly funded by the Kremlin. He said that, in September 2024 alone, over $15 million in Russian funds had been transferred to more than 130,000 Moldovan citizens’ personal bank accounts.

Ilan Shor, a fugitive Moldovan-Israeli oligarch with a history of financial crimes, is currently residing in Russia and is believed to be behind the vote-buying scheme through his organization Evrazia. Investigators have found that Shor used a complex network of banks to launder the funds. These were then distributed through Telegram to recruit and pay local activists and officials to promote a pro-Russian agenda. Shor is wanted in Moldova for his role in a massive bank fraud that drained the country’s financial system of over $1 billion, leading to a 15-year prison sentence in absentia.

The Shor Effect

While Shor’s own political party was declared unconstitutional and banned in 2023, he remains influential in pro-Russian opposition circles. Indeed, a report by Moldova’s Security and Intelligence Service pinpointed him as the main actor in the criminal network that Russia used to implement its interference plan. We know that spreading disinformation is a key part of Moscow’s meddling strategy, and it is thought that Shor funded more than 40 websites, as well as social media advertisements, which undermined Moldova’s sense of EU integration and attacked President Sandu. While the advertisements were repeatedly reported and blocked on Meta, Evrazia used a Telegram chatbot called STOP EU/СТОП ЕС to recruit 20,000 users to vote against making EU accession part of Moldova’s constitution. These people were paid sums ranging from $50 to $2,500 per month for posting anti-EU material and comments. According to President Sandu, tens of millions of dollars were spent by Russia and its local allies, and the scale of information manipulated was unprecedented.

In the real world, Shor allegedly paid vandals to target official buildings in Chisinau, such as TeleRadio Moldova, the Ministry of Labor, the Government Building and the Central Election Commission. The arrested suspects were part of a larger group that had received training in Moscow on how to carry out coordinated acts of vandalism and violent protests, highlighting the extent to which Russia is willing to support extremist activities in Moldova.

The Kremlin’s influence operations also targeted Moldova’s clergy, with around 300 priests from the Moldovan Orthodox Church receiving ‘pilgrimages’ to Russia organized and paid for by Shor. The trips, ostensibly aimed at strengthening clergy relations, were actually used to bribe the priests. During their visits, they were wined and dines, and many received a payment card with the promise of 1000 euros per month for things like church repairs. In return, they were expected to exert political influence, and given that Moldova is a highly religious country, they were well placed to do so.

Diaspora Delivers for Moldovan Democracy

Something that Moscow had likely underestimated in planning this operation was the power of the Moldovan diaspora’s vote, although, false bomb alerts were called in to a number of Moldovan diplomatic missions in Europe in an effort to limit turnout. Approximately 1 million Moldovans live abroad (compared to the country’s population of 2.5 million), mainly in EU countries. Their votes had a profound impact on both the presidential elections and the referendum. The result of the referendum was actually negative within Moldova itself, with 54% voting against and 46% supporting the constitutional amendment. However, of the 245,000 votes placed by members of the Moldovan diaspora, some 170,000 were in favor of EU integration, and this changed the overall outcome.

The pro-European diaspora also played a crucial role in Sandu’s victory in the second round of the presidential elections. They cast around one in five of the 1.699 million votes, 83% of which were in favor of the current president. In addition to this, 130,000 more Moldovans living abroad voted in the runoff that in the first round. Again, it was a different story in Moldova, where Sandu’s rival narrowly beat her with 51% of the votes.

Reports suggest that the Kremlin will attempt to interfere in the upcoming Moldovan parliamentary elections, using similar tactics to those previously employed. The diaspora’s votes are likely to be crucial in determining the outcome. However, there is another, more surreptitious, weapon that the Kremlin will also deploy: the Trojan horse.

Deception in Plain Sight

In our next article, we’ll expose the Kremlin’s tactics of supporting parties that masquerade as pro-EU but are, in reality, backed by Russian interests. We’ll be shining a light on the Alternative Bloc, a party that has been misleading Western-leaning Moldovans, and its ties to Ilan Shor, a familiar figure with a history of manipulating Moldovan politics. We’ll reveal how these parties are being used to further Russian interests in the region.

Pablo González Yague is a Spanish journalist based in Poland, who has been spending some time at the entrance to the Donbass. From the sound of his recent Tweets, he has been having a little conversation with the SBU.

Naturally, Pablo could not resist thanking his Twitter followers for their support and giving away a little bit of information about his ordeal with the SBU detailing how he is under threat of expulsion and how the SBU have copied his phone. His tweets had some Twitter users questioning what he had done to be in the SBU’s focus… A very good question indeed, well our sources in Ukraine have informed us that Pablo is in fact a GRU agent. Why would a GRU agent want to be at the entrance to the Donbass?

Place your bets, where will Pablo González Yague be heading when he leaves Ukraine?

Follow us on Twitter @Nightingal62955 for more investigations, arriving soon.