After months of intense research and investigation, we at nightingale are ready to shed light on the Kremlin’s meddling in Moldova’s recent elections. Our team has been working behind the scenes to uncover the truth about Russian influence in the region, and we’re now ready to share our findings. We’ve discovered that Ilan Shor, a fugitive oligarch with a history of manipulating Moldovan politics, is backing parties that present themselves as pro-EU but are, in fact, serving Russian interests. One such party is the Alternativa Bloc, which has been misleading Western-leaning Moldovans. In this series, we’ll expose the tactics being used to undermine Moldova’s pro-European trajectory and reveal the truth about the Kremlin’s influence in the region.
Moldova: The Prize in a Global Game
Often labelled the least visited country in Europe, it can be easy to overlook the small nation of Moldova, nestled between Ukraine and Romania in the east of the continent.
Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many have wondered whether Moldova would be next in Moscow’s bit to regain control of the former Soviet republics. There have been concerns that Russian forces might attempt to join up with the roughly 1500 Russian soldiers stationed in Moldova’s breakaway region of Transnistria, thus simultaneously creating a new front against Ukraine and derailing Moldova from its pro-Western path.
Fortunately, this situation has not yet arisen, but the Kremlin is instead trying to secure Moldova’s alignment with Russia by waging a battle for influence in the political sphere.
Election Close Calls
On October 20th 2024, elections were held in Moldova to decide whether the country’s pro-European Union (EU) and reformist president Maia Sandy would remain in power for a second term. A referendum on whether to amend the nation’s constitution and make EU accession a constitutional goal took place at the same time. These two events were very significant because their outcomes would effectively determine whether Moldova would continue on its course towards the EU or veer away towards Russia.
Despite expectations of a landslide vote in favor of integration into the EU, the referendum only narrowly passed; and while Sandu won the presidential vote, her victory was not convincing enough to avoid a runoff, and she only defeated Russia-friendly opponent Aleksandr Stoianoglo in the second round of the presidential elections on November 3rd 2024.
Kremlin’s meddling Exposed
The close results of both votes raised questions about the factors at play. While the government’s performance was a feature, the close results were largely due to a sophisticated interference campaign orchestrated by the Russian State. The Russian State used a network of operatives to buy votes, transferring large sums of money to Moldovan citizens’ bank accounts. Moldova’s chief of police revealed a network aimed at paying citizens to vote against EU integration, allegedly funded by the Kremlin. He said that, in September 2024 alone, over $15 million in Russian funds had been transferred to more than 130,000 Moldovan citizens’ personal bank accounts.
Ilan Shor, a fugitive Moldovan-Israeli oligarch with a history of financial crimes, is currently residing in Russia and is believed to be behind the vote-buying scheme through his organization Evrazia. Investigators have found that Shor used a complex network of banks to launder the funds. These were then distributed through Telegram to recruit and pay local activists and officials to promote a pro-Russian agenda. Shor is wanted in Moldova for his role in a massive bank fraud that drained the country’s financial system of over $1 billion, leading to a 15-year prison sentence in absentia.
The Shor Effect
While Shor’s own political party was declared unconstitutional and banned in 2023, he remains influential in pro-Russian opposition circles. Indeed, a report by Moldova’s Security and Intelligence Service pinpointed him as the main actor in the criminal network that Russia used to implement its interference plan. We know that spreading disinformation is a key part of Moscow’s meddling strategy, and it is thought that Shor funded more than 40 websites, as well as social media advertisements, which undermined Moldova’s sense of EU integration and attacked President Sandu. While the advertisements were repeatedly reported and blocked on Meta, Evrazia used a Telegram chatbot called STOP EU/СТОП ЕС to recruit 20,000 users to vote against making EU accession part of Moldova’s constitution. These people were paid sums ranging from $50 to $2,500 per month for posting anti-EU material and comments. According to President Sandu, tens of millions of dollars were spent by Russia and its local allies, and the scale of information manipulated was unprecedented.
In the real world, Shor allegedly paid vandals to target official buildings in Chisinau, such as TeleRadio Moldova, the Ministry of Labor, the Government Building and the Central Election Commission. The arrested suspects were part of a larger group that had received training in Moscow on how to carry out coordinated acts of vandalism and violent protests, highlighting the extent to which Russia is willing to support extremist activities in Moldova.
The Kremlin’s influence operations also targeted Moldova’s clergy, with around 300 priests from the Moldovan Orthodox Church receiving ‘pilgrimages’ to Russia organized and paid for by Shor. The trips, ostensibly aimed at strengthening clergy relations, were actually used to bribe the priests. During their visits, they were wined and dines, and many received a payment card with the promise of 1000 euros per month for things like church repairs. In return, they were expected to exert political influence, and given that Moldova is a highly religious country, they were well placed to do so.
Diaspora Delivers for Moldovan Democracy
Something that Moscow had likely underestimated in planning this operation was the power of the Moldovan diaspora’s vote, although, false bomb alerts were called in to a number of Moldovan diplomatic missions in Europe in an effort to limit turnout. Approximately 1 million Moldovans live abroad (compared to the country’s population of 2.5 million), mainly in EU countries. Their votes had a profound impact on both the presidential elections and the referendum. The result of the referendum was actually negative within Moldova itself, with 54% voting against and 46% supporting the constitutional amendment. However, of the 245,000 votes placed by members of the Moldovan diaspora, some 170,000 were in favor of EU integration, and this changed the overall outcome.
The pro-European diaspora also played a crucial role in Sandu’s victory in the second round of the presidential elections. They cast around one in five of the 1.699 million votes, 83% of which were in favor of the current president. In addition to this, 130,000 more Moldovans living abroad voted in the runoff that in the first round. Again, it was a different story in Moldova, where Sandu’s rival narrowly beat her with 51% of the votes.
Reports suggest that the Kremlin will attempt to interfere in the upcoming Moldovan parliamentary elections, using similar tactics to those previously employed. The diaspora’s votes are likely to be crucial in determining the outcome. However, there is another, more surreptitious, weapon that the Kremlin will also deploy: the Trojan horse.
Deception in Plain Sight
In our next article, we’ll expose the Kremlin’s tactics of supporting parties that masquerade as pro-EU but are, in reality, backed by Russian interests. We’ll be shining a light on the Alternative Bloc, a party that has been misleading Western-leaning Moldovans, and its ties to Ilan Shor, a familiar figure with a history of manipulating Moldovan politics. We’ll reveal how these parties are being used to further Russian interests in the region.
